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ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 
 
 Jing Men
1 
Vesalius College 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper studies EU-China relations in the 21
st century in order to identify the 
achievements of the two sides and the challenges they still face. The paper starts with a 
historical  review  of  bilateral  relations  and  of t h e  p o l i c y  p a p e r s  i s s u e d  b y  b o t h  
governments. The paper also examines the framework established by the two sides to 
facilitate bilateral communication and cooperation. In the second part, the paper focuses 
on agreements and disagreements between the EU and China by looking at several issues 
of  mutual  concern.  The  issues  covered  include:  understanding  of  the  international 
political structure; cooperation in international affairs; the lifting of the arms embargo on 
China; and trade disputes. Through the analysis of these issues, the paper points out the 
progress and problems in bilateral relations in an effort to help readers better understand 
the EU-China strategic partnership. 
 
EU-China relations have been developing rapidly in recent years. Apart from the 
influence  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  t h e  p o s t -Cold  War  era,  the 
developments  in  both  the  European  Union  (EU)  and  China  have  created  a  favorable 
context for progress in bilateral relations. Both sides have undergone huge changes in 
recent years. The birth of the EU is a remarkable achievement of European integration. 
From  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  to  the  coming  into  effect  of  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht; from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
in  the  early  1950s  to  the  development  of  the  internal  market; t h e  E U  h a s  b e e n  
demonstrating to the world the power of economic integration. Far away from the EU, on 
the other side of the globe, China has also achieved great progress thanks to the economic 
and political reforms carried out since the end of the 1970s. From planned economy to 
market  economy; f r o m  p r o m o t i n g  w o r l d  r e v o l u t i o n  t o  m a i n t a i n i n g  g l o b a l  p e a c e  a n d  
promoting development; China has been steadily rising. China’s changes attract the EU, 
and the EU’s experience fascinates China. Since the 1990s, the mutual attraction of the 
two sides has brought their bilateral relationship to a new high. 
 
 
Historical Review of Bilateral Relations 
 
In con trast to th e rapi d growth  of  bil ateral  coop erati on  i n  th e l ast decade, th e 
initial  development of  bilateral  relations b e tw e e n  th e  EU  a n d  Ch i n a  was rath er sl ow. 
Although  the  People’s  Republic  of  China ( P R C)  w a s  f ou n de d  i n  1 9 4 9 , an d  th e  f i rs t 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Prof. Martin Staniland for his helpful comments and good advice on this 
paper.   2 
European Community (EC) came into existence in the 1950s, official relations between 
the two were not established until 1975. It took more than twenty years for the two sides 
to come together, not only because of the international political realities of the Cold War, 
but also due to the  very different poli tical standpoints held by  the Europeans and the 
Chinese. During the Cold War era, China and the Western European countries belonged 
to two different ideological camps—China joined the socialist camp led by the Soviet 
Union  while th e  W es te r n  Eu r op e a n  c ou n tr i e s  were  in th e  c a pi tal i s t c am p  l e d b y  th e 
United States (US). Different political positions and ideological beliefs created animosity 
between  the  two  sides.  China  regarded  the  Western  European c o u n t r i e s  as  the 
“contemptible lackeys of the United States”.
2 In the mid-1970s, encouraged by the Sino-
US  rapprochement  and  mutual  recognition  between  China  and  most  of  the  Western 
European countries,
3 the EC established diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
Despite this breakthrough in diplomatic relations between Beijing and Brussels, 
bilateral cooperation developed slowly during the next twenty years. Both international 
and domestic factors contributed to this lack of progress. As David Shambaugh remarked, 
Brussels-Beijing relations were to a large degree derivative from their respective relations 
with Moscow and Washington.
4 The com peti ti on between the superpowers obstructed 
cooperation between Beijing and Brussels. Moreover, nei ther side had an independent 
motive for developing relations with the other. By the end of the Cold War, Brussels and 
Beijing had only reached two relatively important agreements: a trade agreement in 1978 
and an agreement on trade and economic cooperation in 1985.  
After the end of the Cold War, the global bipolar structure disappeared overnight 
due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Worldwide, the focus was diverted from political 
and security issues to the development of economic globalization. Economic security has 
become a prominent issue in the post-Cold War era.  
In the transitional period, EU-China relations faced a challenge. The suppression 
of the students’ dem onstrati on in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 by the Chinese 
government triggered economic sanctions and an arms embargo by the West, with the US 
taking the lead. The EC joined the sanctions against China. Yet the relationship between 
the EC and the PRC was gradually normalized only one year later. Despite differences of 
opinion  inside the Community, the attraction  of the  Chinese  market  and  the  benefits 
brought by economic cooperation with China reminded the Community of the importance 
of this big country and convinced the Community to relax sanctions. 
                                                 
2 Donald W. Klein, “Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations,” in Samuel S. Kim (ed.) China and 
the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 113. 
3 Since Sino-US relations improved in the early 1970s, many Western European countries established 
diplomatic relations with Beijing in a short period. Among them, Italy recognized the PRC in 1970; 
Belgium and Austria in 1971; and the United Kingdom, West Germany, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands 
in 1972. Much earlier, France, against the opposition of the United States, established official relations with 
China in 1964. West Germany wanted to follow suit, but due to great pressure from Washington, it had to 
give the attempt up. Examination of this period shows that the United States played an important role in 
hampering and promoting bilateral relations between China and the Western European countries. 
4 David Shambaugh, “China and Europe,” Current History, Vol. 103, No. 674 (September 2004), p. 245.   3 
Meanwhile, internal reforms and liberalization had brought dramatic changes to 
China itself. A high annual growth rate of nine per cent was maintained for more than a 
decade. China’s trade with the EU had grown rapidly from US$ 2.135 billion in 1980 to 
US$  14.58  billion  in  1994.  For  the  EU,  the  report  “Towards  a  New  Asia  Strategy” 
produced by the Commission in 1994 marked the starting point of the EU’s rising interest 
in Asia. Located at the centre of the EU’s Asia strategy, China was given substantial 
attention. Starting from the first strategically -influential document “A long term policy 
for China-Europe relations” in 1995, EU-China relations developed on a fast track. 
 
 
Policy Papers 
 
The Commission’s 1995 paper marked the opening of a new stage in bil ateral  
relations. This document indicated an understanding by the EU of the rising importance 
of China in the worl d and pointed out the need to improve relations with China. The 
document suggested that the EU should establish a long-term relationship with China and 
that this relationship should reflect China’s economic and political influence in the world 
and the region. It remarked: 
 
 
The rise of China is unmatched amongst national experiences since the  
Second World War. Japan has made its mark as an economic power, the  
Soviet Union survived essentially as a military power. China is increasingly  
strong in both the military-political and the economic spheres. China is in  
the midst of sustained and dramatic economic and social change at home.  
Abroad, China is becoming part of the world security and economic system  
at a time of greater economic interdependence and when global problems,  
from protection of the environment to nuclear non-proliferation, require  
coordinated commitment from governments worldwide.
5 
 
 
The document stressed China’s development and argued that it was time to reinforce the 
EU’s d i p l o m a t i c  t i e s  w i t h  C h i n a .  Apart  from  the  mutually-beneficial  economic 
relationship, the EU approached China with the purpose of engaging the rising power 
diplomatically.  With  impressive  insight,  the d o c u m e n t  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  c o m i n g  
relationship with China would be “a cornerstone in Europe’s external relations, both with 
Asia and globally.”
6 
Another communication by the Commission, issued in 1998, held that “China’s 
emergence as an increasingly confident world power is of immense historic significance, 
                                                 
5 Communication of the EU Commission, “A long-term policy for China-Europe Relations,” Brussels, 5 
July 1995, COM(1995) 279 final, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/china/com95_279en.pdf  
6 Ibid.   4 
both to Europe and to the international community as a whole.”
7  As the new document 
noted, much had changed in Europe, China and the world since production of the first 
such p o l i c y  p a p e r  t h r e e  y e a r s  e a r l i e r .  The  EU  needed  to  update  its  policy  paper  in 
response to the challenges posed by the changes in China. The EU recognized the rising 
influence of China and said that it intended to build a comprehensive partnership with the 
rising Asian power. As partners, the EU should (the new paper said) aim at “engaging 
China further, through an upgraded political dialogue, in the international community,” 
and “supporting China’s transition to an open society based on the rule of law and the 
respect for human rights.”
8  
The comprehensive partnership was upgraded in 2003 to a strategic partnership, 
thanks to the smooth development of cooperation between the two sides. As an oth e r  
policy paper produced by the Commission indicated, the EU started to emphasize shared 
interests  not  only  in  bilateral  relations,  but  also  in  global  affairs.  Based  on  the 
developments of past years, the EU and China started to attach more importance to the 
strategic side of their partnership. The policy paper of 2003 recognized that “the EU and 
China have an ever-greater interest to work together as strategic partners to safeguard and 
promote sustainable development, peace and stability.”
9 
Also i n  2 0 0 3 ,  the  Chinese  government  issued  its  first  “EU P o l i c y  P a p e r . ” 
Although this Chinese policy paper was eight years later than the first EU policy paper on 
China, this was nevertheless the first policy paper targeting a specific country or a region 
ever produced by Beijing, suggesting that China attached great importance to its relations 
with the Europeans. The comparison between the policy papers f rom the two si des is 
interesting. While the EU stressed the importance of human rights and China’s transition 
to  an  open  society,  China  only  covered  the  human  rights  discussions  in o n e  s h o r t  
paragraph. China, while admitting that there were differences in understanding between 
the two sides, nevertheless maintained that there is “no fundamental conflict of interest 
between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other.”
10 
The strategic partnership brought EU-China relations into a honeymoon period 
between 2003 and 2004. Exchanges of visits by top leaders on both sides became more 
frequent. For example, EU officials paid 206 visits to China in 2004, on average four 
times  a  week,  in  order  to  exchange  views  with  Chinese  colleagues.
11 T h e  C h i n ese 
Premier, Wen Jiabao, was the first foreign leader to pay an official visit to the EU in May 
2004 after its historically-important eastward enlargement. As Romano Prodi, the former 
                                                 
7 Communication of the EU Commission, “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China,” Brussels, 
March 25, 1998, COM (1998)181 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com_98/index.htm     
8 Ibid.  
9 Commission policy paper, “A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China 
relations,” September 10, 2003, COM(2003) 533 final, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/china/com_03_533/com_533_en.pdf  
10 “China’s EU policy paper,” October 13, 2003, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm.  
11 Benita Ferrero Waldner, “The EU, China and the quest for a multilateral world,” 4 July 2005, available at 
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_china/30th/sp05_414.htm    5 
President of the European Commission, said about EU-China relations at the EU-China 
business  forum  in  May  2004,  “if  it  is  not  a  marriage,  it  is  at  least  a  very  serious 
engagement.”
12 
But since 2005, the partnership has been encountering increasing difficulties. The 
arms embargo (imposed after the Tiananmen Square episode) is still in place and the EU 
has  a  growing  trade  deficit  with  China.  As  a  result,  the  initial enthusiasm about th e 
partnership has been gradually replaced by disappointment. Both Brussels and Beijing 
have  become  more  realistic.  While  cautiously  optimistic  about  the  future  of  the 
partnership,  both  sides  have  come  to  recognize  the  existence  of m isunderstandings, 
disputes, and frictions. Three years after the strategic partnership had been established 
with China, the Commission tried to summarize developments in bilateral relations in its 
sixth policy paper in 2006. While confirming the rising influence of China, it emphasized 
the shared responsibility between China and the EU for maintaining global peace and 
stability. The EU repeated its engagement policy towards China and its commitment to 
support China’s transition towards an open society. Meanwhile, it also realized that: 
 
 
Europe needs to respond effectively to China’s renewed strength. To tackle  
the key challenges facing Europe today—including climate change,  
employment, migration, security—we need to leverage the potential of a  
dynamic relationship with China based on our values.
13 
 
 
Unlike t h e  p r e v i o u s  p o l i c y  p a p e r s ,   the  new  policy  paper  issued  by  the 
Commission included two separate documents.
14 The growing deficits in the EU’s trade 
with China, increasing complaints from European investors about copyright issues, and 
the  non-transparent  market  conditions  obliged t h e  E u r o p e a n s  t o  r e -evaluate  their 
cooperation with the Chinese. While emphasizing the importance of the partnership with 
China, they requested the Chinese to compete in a fairer way by further opening up their 
market and leveling the playing field, particularly for copyrights of high-tech products.
15 
 
The rapidly growing political and economic relations between the EU and China 
caused b o t h  s i d e s  t o  r e v i s e  t h e i r  c o o p e r a t i o n  f r a m e w o r k  d a t ing b a c k  to 1 9 8 5 .  B o t h  
Brussels and Beijing have come to realize that the old framework can no longer cover the 
more comprehensive level of cooperation developed during the past two decades. Since 
                                                 
12 Romano Prodi, “Relations between the EU and China: more than just business,” 6 May 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp04_227.htm    
13 See  “EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities,” Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, COM(2006) 631 final, Brussels, 24 October 2006, p. 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/docs/06-10-24_final_com.pdf  
14 The policy paper issued in 2006 is composed of two documents, with one focusing specifically on EU-
China economic and trade relations and the other on EU-China political and strategic cooperation.  
15 See “A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment: Competition and Partnership Brussels,” 
Commission Working Document, Accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing 
Responsibilities, COM(2006) 632 final, 24 October 2006, p. 11, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130791.pdf    6 
January  2007,  a  new  Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreement  (PCA)  has  been un d e r 
negotiation between the leaders of the two sides and is expected to reflect the full scope 
of bilateral relations. These negotiations are expected to take several years. Needless to 
say, this new agreement will be another important step in EU-China relations. 
 
 
Framework of Bilateral Relations 
 
As the basis for wider and deeper cooperation between the EU and China, the 
comprehensive strategic partnership needs to be examined in much more detail. Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao, in one of his speeches, defined clearly what the Chinese expected 
from  the  relationship.  “Comprehensive”  refers  to “ a l l -dimensional,  wide-ranging  and 
multi-layered  cooperation”  in  various  fields,  including  the  economy,  science  and 
technology,  politics,  and  culture.  “Strategic”  in  this  context  implies  “long-term  and 
stable...EU-China  relations”  which  transcend  “the  differences  in  ideology  and  social 
system” and are “not subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to 
time.” “Partnership” is defined as cooperation: 
 
 
… on an equal footing, mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides  
should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavor  
to expand converging interests and seek common ground on major issues,  
while shelving differences on minor ones.
16  
 
 
Premier Wen’s understanding of the partnership implies a very pragmatic attitude on the 
part of the Chinese government in its relationship with the EU. Through stable and long-
lasting cooperative ties, the Chinese intend to deemphasize the differences so as to get the 
best out of the relationship.  
 
Although the EU has never directly explained the strategic partnership, its policy 
paper in 2003 pointed out that the EU and China share “responsibilities in promoting 
global governance.” The EU and China (it said) should work together “to safeguard and 
promote sustainable development, peace and stability.”
17 In other words, as the EU is 
becoming  a  global  actor,  it  sees  itself  as  having  an  increasing  strategic  interest  in 
maintaining international stability and order. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, said in Berlin later that year that: 
 
 
America is the pre-eminent world power. But no single country, however  
powerful, can deal with all the problems alone…. A stronger Europe with  
a common strategic vision is also a Europe capable of consolidating  
                                                 
16 “Wen stresses importance of developing EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership,” People’s Daily 
Online, 7 May 2004, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200405/07/eng20040507_142556.html  
17 Commission policy paper, “A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China 
relations,” see note 8.   7 
relationships with the other great partners.... This means that it must also  
be a pillar of the organization of a new world, more free and more united,  
fairer and safer.
18  
 
 
Both the EU and China are active in advancing their own influence worldwide. In the 
meantime,  they  support  each  other  in  playing  a  more  important  role  in  international 
affairs.  
In  order  to  strengthen  communication  and  cooperation,  a  summit  meeting 
mechanism has been used by the two sides since 1998. The top leaders meet once a year 
in autumn or early winter to discuss the most important issues of bilateral concern. Along 
with the annual summit meetings, other notable  developments have  included sectoral 
agreements and political dialogues. Since the 1990s, Brussels and Beijing have decided to 
develop  exchange  and  cooperation  programs  to  give  full  play  to t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  
advantages each side enjoys and to deepen and widen economic cooperation in many 
sectors. 
Such p o l i t i c a l  d i a l o g u e  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  p a v e s t h e  w a y  f o r  e c o n o m i c  
cooperation, while economic cooperation itself further stimulates political coordination 
between the EU and China. The stable development of bilateral relations is, to a certain 
degree, due to the fact that the EU and all its member states adhere to the “one China” 
policy. The US and the EU have different ways of handling the Cross-Strait issues. US-
Taiwan relations have been far closer over the years than EU-Taiwan relations. The US 
has a Taiwan Relations Act, which is the legal basis for its relationship with Taiwan, 
while  the  twenty-seven m e m b e r  states o f  t h e  E U  h a v e  n o  s u c h  legal  framework.  In 
contrast to the US, EU countries do not sell weapons or defense technologies to Taiwan 
(except  for  France  in  the  early  1990s).  Furthermore, n o Eur opean  mil i tary  f orces are 
stationed in East Asia. The EU has no real military or strategic interests in this region. 
This  allows  EU-China  relations  to  move  forward  without  being  harassed  by  the 
complicated Taiwan issue, as in the case of US-China relations.
19 
 
 
Policy Convergence and Divergence Between the EU and China 
 
The EU and China are forging a strategic partnership at a historical moment in the 
latter’s  transition. Yet b o th  si d es  a dm i t th a t p r o b l em s  an d  di f f i c ul ti e s  ex i s t. In  many 
areas,  there  are  both  policy  convergence  and  divergence  between  the  two  sides.  To 
further the partnership, the Chinese promote the idea of “seeking common ground while 
reserving differences,” while the EU actively seeks to enhance the political and economic 
dialogues with China. 
                                                 
18 Javier Solana, “The EU Security Strategy—Implications for Europe’s Role in a Changing World,” 12 
November 2003, available at http://www.iep-berlin.de/mittagsgespraeche/mig-2003/mig-03-solana-
en_speech.pdf  
19 Shambaugh, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis,” p. 246.   8 
Multilateralism Versus Multipolarity: Between Shared Understanding and Tacit 
Interpretation 
 
A common understanding of the international political structure is the foundation 
for bilateral cooperation between the EU and China. In the post-Cold War era, both the 
EU and China intend to play a greater role in international affairs, and both promote the 
formation of a political structure that facilitates the ascendance of their political influence 
globally. In particular, the Chinese government has been getting closer to the position of 
the EU in advocating multilateralism in its external relations. 
 
The Chinese have been known by their efforts to push toward multipolarity in the 
post-Cold War era. The Chinese policy of multipolarity is attributed to Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping, who in one of his speeches claimed: 
 
 
Nowadays the old structure is in the process of transformation, and the  
new structure is not yet formed…. No matter how many poles there will  
be in the world structure, three poles, four poles, or even five poles…. for  
the so-called multi-polarity, China should be counted as one of the poles.
20  
 
 
The  Chinese  leaders  are  clear  that  multipolarity  cannot  come  about o v e r n i g h t .  I n  
Beijing’s view, “the move towards multipolarity is a tortuous and long process.”
21  
 
In  the  first  EU-China  summit i n  1 9 9 8 , the Chinese proposed to use the term 
“multipolarity” in the final joint declaration. The British representative resisted this idea, 
probably  being a f r a i d  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  m a k e  the  US u n h a p p y .
22  The  EU  prefers 
multilateralism to multipolarity. According to Benita Ferrero Waldner, the Commissioner 
for External Relations: 
 
 
For the EU, … it is not the number of poles which counts, but rather the  
basis on which they operate. Our vision is a world governed by rules created  
and monitored by multilateral institutions. And I know China shares this 
approach.”
23  
 
 
The EU is wary of the term multipolarity, fearing that the weak transatlantic relationship 
after the Iraqi crisis would be further damaged by its misinterpretation in Washington. 
 
                                                 
20 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: People’s 
Publishing House, 1993), Vol. 3, p. 353. 
21 Chinese government’s viewpoint on multipolarity before 2003 is available at 
http://www.chinaembassy.se/eng/zgwj/jbzc/t100415.htm   
22 The author got this information from her interview with a Chinese diplomat. 
23 Benita Ferrero Waldner, “The EU, China and the quest for a multilateral world,” see note 10.   9 
China,  although  by  no  means  hiding  its  craving  for  multipolarity,  has  quietly 
revised its view on the development of multipolarity in recent years. Before 2003, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry held that multipolarity “helps weaken and curb hegemonism 
and power politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable order and contributes to 
world peace and development.”
24 Without mentioning the US by name, China made it 
clear that such a policy of multipolarity was intended to counterbalance American power: 
 
 
At present, by virtue of its economic, technological and military advantages,  
an individual country is pursuing a new "gunboat policy" in contravention  
of the United Nations Charter and the universally-acknowledged principles  
governing international relations in an attempt to establish a monopolar  
world under its guidance. This is against the tide of history and is doomed  
to failure. Innumerable historical facts demonstrate that hegemonism may  
hold sway for a time, but it cannot wreak havoc for a long time. China is  
firmly opposed (to) any form of hegemonism and power politics.
25 
 
 
Its interactions with the outside world necessarily shape China’s understanding of 
international relations. In the diplomatic field, the Chinese have been gradually changing 
from  an  exclusively  bilateral  approach  to  an i n c r e a s i n g  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  m u l t i lateral 
approach, from suspicion of multilateralism to being gradually at ease with it. Such a 
change  has  also  affected  its  interpretation  of  multipolarity.  Since 2 0 0 3 ,  a  n e w  
understanding  of  multipolarity  by  the  Chinese  government  has  appeared.  As  the 
following statement indicated: 
 
 
Our efforts to promote the development of the world towards multi- 
polarization are not targeted at any particular country, nor are they aimed  
at re-staging the old play of contention for hegemony in history. Rather,  
these efforts are made to boost the democratization of international relations,  
help the various forces in the world, on the basis of equality and mutual  
benefit, enhance coordination and dialogue, refrain from confrontation and 
preserve jointly world peace, stability and development.
26 
 
 
While the term multipolarity is still used by the Chinese government, its implication has 
been quietly changing. In the new interpretation, the Chinese highlight the elements of 
multilateralism such as democratization of international relations and the strengthening of 
coordination and dialogue, which to a large degree has brought them closer to the EU’s 
understanding of international relations. Although the term multipolarity is still in use, 
the Chinese are oriented more towards multilateralism in international politics in the 21
st 
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century. Such changes are rather recent. They help bring the Chinese and the Europeans 
closer in their understanding of international politics. 
 
 
International Cooperation: Between Lofty UN Principles and Down-to-Earth National 
Interests 
 
For a long time after the founding of the PRC, China was forced to stay outside 
the United Nations (UN) due to the US’s support for the Chiang Kai-shek government in 
Taiwan. The Beijing government was only recognized by the UN in 1971, largely thanks 
to th e  s u p p o r t  o f  an i n c r e a s i n g  number of  n e w l y -independent  countries  in  Asia a n d  
Africa. Partly because the Chinese Communist regime was regarded as illegitimate in the 
UN w h e r e  t h e  U S  w a s  d o m i n a n t ,  Beijing  had  adopted a  revolutionary  approach  to 
international relations from the 1950s to the 1970s. Since the adoption of the opening and 
reform policy, however, China has gradually changed from attempting to transform the 
international system to supporting it. In contrast to the period between 1949 and 1979 in 
which China was a member of only 34 international conventions, she joined 185 more 
such  agreements  between  1979  and  1999.  China  changed  dramatically  from  being a  
“revolutionary” power outside the international regime to being a relatively conciliatory 
power within the international system.
27 
Since  becoming  a  member  of  the  UN,  China  has  been  learning  to  pursue i t s  
national interest by staying inside the system and exploiting its important position as a 
member  of  the  Security  Council  while d e v e l o p i n g  w o r k a b l e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  other 
countries. A peaceful and stable environment is crucial to enabling China to pursue its 
economic reforms and nati on-building. Maintaining peace is China’s primary national 
interest. As the UN takes peace and development as its lofty causes, Chinese national 
interests and UN goals effectively coincide. But by practicing multilateralism in the UN, 
China also hopes that the UN approach will serve as a check to the US’s unilateralism.  
Regarding multilateralism as one of the successful experiences in its integration 
process, the EU is the most steadfast supporter of this approach. In the face of  most 
regional conflicts, the EU prefers peaceful means to military intervention. Such a general 
standpoint partly led to the crisis in the transatlantic relationship over the Iraqi war in 
2003. Annoyed by German and French recalcitrance regarding the use of force to remove 
Saddam  Hussein,  Donald  Rumsfeld,  the  US  Defense S e c r e t a r y ,  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  t w o  
countries as “problems” in the crisis over Iraq (“the Old Europe”).
28 
In principle, the EU and China support each other in the international arena in 
promoting peace and security and in fighting against terrorism. In reality, high principle 
wrestles with individual national interests. When the principle conforms to self-interest, 
there is no problem of cooperation between the EU and China. As China’s high-profile 
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Security Interests), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 1 (2003), p. 11. 
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mediation  between  the  parties  involved  in  the  Korean  nuclear  crisis s u g g e s t s ,  China 
wants to acquire an image as a responsible power so long as such behavior facilitates or 
at least does not pose a threat to its vital interests. Actively promoting first the four-party 
talks and then the six-party talks, China played a crucial role in pushing the crisis towards 
a peaceful solution. The joint declaration in September 2005 by the US and North Korea 
would have been impossible without the earnest mediation  of  the  Chinese. Thanks to 
China’s efforts, the breakthrough  in early 2007  in the  six-party talks  led to the  final 
solution of the crisis. The EU spoke approvingly of China’s achievement over the North 
Korean problem. In a similar way, the EU is making efforts to solve the Iranian nuclear 
crisis in a peaceful way.  
However, the issue of Iran is much more complicated for the Chinese than the 
issue of North Korea. To keep the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons conforms to 
China’s national i n t e r e s t ,  b u t  t o  penalize I r a n  even  without conclusive evidence of  a 
nuclear weapons program is an entirely different matter. China became a net oil importer 
in 1993 as a result of lagging domestic oil production and rapid economic development. 
Since then, China has been increasingly dependent on the international oil market. China 
has b e e n  a c ti v e  o v e r s e a s  in  bidding f o r  oi l  c o m p a n i e s  and  in  signing c on tr a c ts  wi th  
countries rich in oil. Official figures show that China imported 226 million tons of oil in 
2003, of which 13 per cent came from Iran. China signed its biggest oil and gas contract 
(one for US$70 billion) with Tehran in 2004.
29 Therefore, when the EU decided to submit 
a motion setting Iran up for referral to the UN Security Council in September 2005, the 
European and Chinese policies clearly diverged. As a matter of fact, China’s attitude had 
already been clarified one year earlier during Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s 
visit to Tehran. According to Mr. Li, referring Iran to the Security Council would only 
make things more complicated.
30 
China’s appetite for energy may affect its foreign policy and lead it astray from 
the basic UN principles it endorses. The anxiety of other countries over the direction of 
China’s  development  was  captured  in an  a r ti cl e i n  th e   International  Herald  Tribune, 
which noted that “Without  assurances  that  its  interests  will  be  respected, … China is 
likely to resist international pressure and potentially be seen as a roadblock to global 
security.”
31 As a rapidly growing power, China’s attitude has a direct impact on global 
security.  China  needs  to  compromise b e t w e e n  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  
establishing a responsible image worldwide. While promoting its interests, it also cares 
more than ever about the international reaction to its foreign policy and external behavior. 
For example,  in the Iranian n ucl ear cri si s in  late 2005, China endorsed the new offer 
given to Iran by the US and the EU, and exerted pressure on Iran to soften its stance.
32 At 
the end of 2006, China also joined the other members of the Security Council to vote 
unanimously  to  impose  a  first,  limited  set  of  sanctions  on I r a n . F a c ing  so  many 
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challenges to a peaceful and stable world, it is in the EU’s and China’s interests to work 
together  on  the  main  strategic  issues  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s . T o  s t r e n g t h e n  
communication and cooperation between the EU and China in international affairs will 
not only serve their own interests, but may also contribute to world peace. 
 
 
The Arms Embargo: Between General Promise and Specific Difficulties 
 
The rapid development of EU-China relations is, as mentioned earlier, attributable 
to improved US-China relations. While both the EU and China attempt to exert greater 
influence in world politics, they admit that the relationship with the US is still the most 
important  external  relationship t h a t  e a c h  h a s  t o  d e a l  w i t h .   The  US  factor  plays  an 
important role in EU-China relations, despite the increasing independence in the EU’s 
foreign  policy-making a n d  the  fact  that  EU-China  relations  have  been  gradually 
developed more through initiatives by Brussels and Beijing.  
Between the EU and China, a crucial issue is the arms embargo imposed in 1989 
by the Western countries against China under the leadership of the US. The lifting of the 
arms embargo has been a topic for discussion in the EU since late 2003. Four countries 
are subject to the EU’s arms embargoes, namely Burma, Sudan, Zimbabwe and China. 
To equate China with the other three countries on the embargo list is inconsistent with the 
strategic partnership between the EU and China. As the arms embargo is the lingering 
legacy of the Tiananmen event in 1989, it’s removal would indicate the EU’s recognition 
of China’s progress in recent years, as well as its growing clout in global affairs. The EU, 
led by France and Germany, agreed that a new code of conduct
33 regulating deliveries of 
European weapons to Beijing should be prepared to replace the arms embargo.  
In appearance, lifting of the arms embargo seems to be simply a bilateral issue. 
The US, due to its close relationship with Taiwan and its suspicion of China’s emergence 
in the world, interferes with and strongly objects to any discussion in the EU of lifting the 
embargo. Since the beginning of 2005, the Bush administration has been increasingly 
vocal in opposing a lifting of the embargo. President Bush and other American leaders 
have visited the EU and its member states to convince them that the arms embargo should 
be kept. The American Congress has also reacted strongly against any relaxation of the 
arms ban. Earlier in February 2005, the American House of Representatives passed a 
resolution by 411-3 that condemned the EU’s plan.  
Two strategic concerns make the Americans worried. First, they fear that lifting 
the arms embargo will change the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait in China’s 
favor. Such a shift may tempt Beijing to resolve Taiwan’s future by force. Secondly, the 
Americans are reluctant to see China replace the US as the pre-eminent power in the 
Asia-Pacific region. With weapons bought from the EU, the Americans fear that China 
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will challenge US military supremacy in the region and be able to deter, delay, or deny 
American military intervention in the Pacific.
34   
Rather than being a bilateral issue, the arms embargo turns out to be an important 
concern for all three parties. The EU faces a difficult situation due to pressure from the 
US and its commitment to the Chinese on lifting the embargo. In order to get the US to 
acquiesce in lif ting the arms ban, the EU plans to prepare a carefully drafted code of 
conduct with the intention of keeping arms sales to China under strict control. The EU 
argued that the “results of any decision should not be an increase of arms exports from 
EU member states to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms.” The EU stated 
that its: 
 
 
… objective is not to sell to China any items and technologies, which  
would help China to acquire a capability it does not already possess and  
which may have a destabilizing effect in the region. The EU does not  
intend to change the strategic balance in the region, especially in the  
Taiwan Strait.”
35 
 
 
The embargo issue became more complicated after China passed an anti-secession 
law
36 in March 2005. Washington hardened its opposition to EU arms sales to China and 
has urged the EU to maintain the embargo. In order to impede the EU’s determination, 
the US has threatened to cut off American transfers of military technology to Europe. US 
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has warned EU officials that if ever “European 
equipment helped kill American men and women in conflict, that would not be good for 
the (transatlantic) relationship.”
37 Both the US’s position and China’s newly-passed law 
affected the EU’s decision on lifting the embargo. The EU does not want an increase in 
Cross-Strait instability and the risk of an arms race in the Taiwan Strait. Opposition in the 
EU to listing the ban became stronger. In April 2005, the European Parliament voted 431 
to 85, with 31 abstentions, in favor of a resolution urging the EU to keep the weapons 
embargo.
38 Member states disagreed with one another about whether to lift the ban on 
weapons sales to China. As Eldar Subasic, Luxembourg’s Foreign Ministry spokesman 
admitted, “Looking at the positions that have been taken in different capitals, the chance 
of lifting the embargo by June now looks reduced.”
39  
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As  a  result o f  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  anti-secession  law  by  Beijing,  some 
Europeans have argued that the EU’s efforts to lift the arms embargo should be linked to 
a  gesture  from  China  on  progress  in h u m a n  r i g h t s .  A n n a l i s a  G i a n n e l l a ,  personal 
representative on non-proliferation of Javier Solana, remarked in April 2005, “Nobody 
has said we are going to lift our embargo for free. It would require an important concrete 
step to be taken by the Chinese.”
40 The EU hopes that China will soon ratify the United 
Nations  Convention  on  Political  and  Civil  Rights  it  signed  in  1998.  The  British 
ambassador to China, Christopher Hum, said that China must set a timetable for signing 
the  international  covenant  on  human  rights  before  the  EU  will  lift  the  ban.  Angela 
Merkel, the German chancellor, has  insisted that the embargo should remain in place 
until China improves its human rights record.
41  
The arms embargo issue falls into the domain of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) that needs the approval of all of the member states of the EU.
42 When the 
embargo was introduced in 1989, the Community had only 12 members. Following the 
enlargement  process,  the  number  of m e m b e r  s t a t e s  h a s  g r o w n  t o  27.  To  achieve 
consensus on scrapping the arms ban among all the member states will be an arduous 
task.  
Discussion of lifting the arms ban occurred mainly between 2004 and early 2005. 
Due to the damage that the Iraqi war did to transatlantic relations, the European side has 
been  eager  to  repair  its  relations  with  Washington.  In  such  a  context, the Europeans 
wanted  to  avoid  the  embargo  issue  upsetting t h e  A m e r i c a n s .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  
development of the issue disappointed the Chinese. By April 2005, the EU had developed 
a clearer attitude: the issue (it said) should be reconsidered, the timing was not right. 
Beijing  showed  its  disappointment  at the  changing  attitude of  the  EU.  As a  C h i n e se 
newspaper, Global Times, remarked: 
 
 
The EU is doing some hand-wringing again on the arms embargo. This  
reflects the notion that the EU common diplomacy is still weak. The US  
makes an all-out effort to prevent the EU from lifting the ban – this should  
be the EU’s own business. The arms embargo issue shows that (the) EU  
still has difficulty distancing itself from the US in international affairs.
43 
 
 
The US’s pressure on the EU reflects the competitive relationship between the US and 
China over East Asian security. It also reveals that the CFSP is rather weak, and still has 
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a long way to go before the EU can have an independent and well-developed foreign 
policy. 
 
Both the EU and China take pains to dilute the negative impact of this issue on 
bilateral relations. To get the issue solved, the EU needs to assure its Chinese counterpart 
of its commitment to lift the embargo in order to keep the partnership intact. The EU also 
needs to get a green light from the US on the code of conduct. The Chinese government 
needs to address the negative impact of the anti-secession law in the international arena 
by improving its human rights record. It also needs to strengthen the dialogue with the 
US in order to improve mutual understanding about regional stability and peace. Due to 
its traditionally close relationship with the EU and its important strategic interest in the 
Asia-Pacific region, the US enjoys undisputable influence on this issue. How this issue 
might evolve will depend directly on interactions between the three parties involved. 
 
 
Complementary Economies: Between Mutual Benefit and Relative Gains 
 
EU-China relations began with economic cooperation and trade in the Cold War 
period. Since then, the economic complementarities and the pursuit of mutual benefit 
have gradually increased interdependence between the two partners. With low labor costs 
and a  big  market, China  is attractive to the Europeans. On the other hand, the EU’s 
comparative advantage in technology and capital makes China increasingly rely on the 
EU  in  its  economic  modernization.  By  the  end  of  2006,  China  had  approved  an 
accumulated 25,418 EU-funded projects, involving a contracted EU investment of 97.95 
billion US dollars. China has used US$ 53.18 billion of EU funds, or eight per cent of 
total foreign funds used in China.
44 
Compared to the dynamic economic development in China, the economic growth 
rate in the Euro zone is not so impressive. The growth rate of the fifteen member states 
was down from 1.0 per cent to 0.8 per cent in 2003, and the growth rate of the 12 Euro 
countries dropped from 0.8 per cent to 0.4 per cent.
45 Although the economic growth rate 
of the Euro zone has been improving from 1.4 per cent in 2005 to more than 2 per cent in 
2006,  the  European  governments  still  face a  formidable  problem  in  reducing 
unemployment  and  encouraging  sustainable  development.  How  to  effectively  explore 
external markets in order to revitalize the economy is an important concern for the EU 
countries.  
Since the economic reforms were carried out in China in 1978, two-way trade 
between the EU and China  has  been growing at an astonishing speed. Bilateral trade 
reached US$100 billion for the first time in 2003, when it was three times the bilateral 
trade volume in 1995. Encouraged by the rapid growth in bilateral trade, the leaders from 
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both sides set a new target at the EU-China summit in 2003 that two-way trade should 
reach US$200 billion by 2013.
46 To the surprise of both sides, this target was in fact 
fulfilled  by 2005 an d two-way trade grew further  to US$272 billion in 2006.
47 Since 
2004, the EU has become China’s biggest trade partner, while Chi na h as b ecom e the 
EU’s second biggest trade partner after the US.  
Bilateral trade is both an important motive force and a sensitive issue in EU-China 
relations. Together with the impressive growth in bilateral trade, the imbalance in trade 
has been rising rapidly. While China’s exports to the EU grew nearly nine times from 
US$19.09 billion in 1995 to US$181.98 billion in 2006, China’s imports from the EU 
have only increased from US$21.25 billion in 1995 to US$90.32 billion in 2006. In other 
words,  the  EU’s  trade  deficit  has  been  growing  gradually  during  these  years,  from 
US$4.619 billion in 1997 to US$91.66 in 2006.
48 
Such imbalanced trade, according to the EU, has been partly caused by obstacles 
to market access in China. In order to increase its exports to China, the EU has urged 
China to liberalize trade flows by removing barriers to imports including price controls, 
discriminatory registration requirements, and arbitrary sanitary standards.
49 The two sides 
have also strengthened their trade and economic dialogues
50 covering trade policy, the 
trade in textiles, competition policy, customs cooperation, intellectual property rights, and 
regulatory and industrial policy. 
The gap in trade volumes triggered more problems in 2005 when the 40-year-long 
quota regime was abolished on January 1.
51 The sharp rise in Chinese textile exports to 
the EU in the first three months of 2005 led to vocal demands from about half of the 25 
EU member states to impose immediate limits on Chinese textile imports. According to 
the statistics of Chinese customs, Chinese textile exports to the EU-15 countries indicated 
a 78.4 per cent increase compared to the same period of the previous year; its exports to 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium all increased by more  than  80 per cent.
52 
Among the nine categories of textile products under investigation by the EU, the volume 
of T-shirt imports from China into the EU had shot up by 187 per cent, compared with 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 20. 
47 See “China-EU trade hits US$272.3 billion in 2006,” China Daily, 28 January 2006. 
48 Luo Xiumei and Zhang Jing, “2004nian Zhongguo yu Oumeng maoyi huigu” (A Look at the China-EU 
Trade in 2004), Ouzhou yitihua yanjiu (European Integration Studies), No. 2 (2005), p. 33; and “China-EU 
trade hits US$272.3 billion in 2006,” China Daily, 28 January 2006. 
49 See EU-China Trade Relations, available at 
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_china_wto/EU%20China%20Trade%20Relations.htm. 
50 For example, the textile trade dialogue was proposed by Chinese Premier Wen at his visit to Brussels in 
2004 in order to get rid of the potential conflicts after the abolition of textile quotas on 1 January 2005, as 
well as to assure a smooth transition to the quota-free textiles trade environment.  
51 An important conclusion of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement for Trade and Tariff (GATT) in 
1994 was to abolish the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) for the textile and garment industries. The abolition 
of the MFA took ten years from January 1, 1995 to the end of 2004. From January 1, 2005 on, quotas have 
been removed for the export of textile and garment products. 
52 Cai Xiang, “Zhongguo ruhe yingdui Oumeng ‘tebao dabang’” (How China Should Counteract Against 
the EU’s Safeguard Measures), Ouzhou yitihua yanjiu (European Integration Studies), No. 3 (2005), p. 42.   17 
the first quarter of the previous year.
53 When China joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)  in 2001, the admission agreement included a clause that al l owed oth er W TO 
members to safeguard their own textile industries with measures including quotas if they 
face  a  sustained  surge  in  Chinese  imports  that  cause  irrevocable  harm  to  their  own 
producers. Nevertheless, the accession agreement required that all the safeguard measures 
against Chinese textiles be removed by the end of 2008.  
Inside the EU, trade issues fall under the first pillar,
54 which should be dealt with 
by the Commission. Facing a sharp increase in Chinese products in the European market, 
some o f  t h e  m e m b e r  s t a t e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  the  Southern E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  e x e r t e d  
pressure on the Commission to adopt emergency measures against the huge quantity of 
Chinese imports coming into Europe. Fearing that the dispute on textiles, in addition to 
the recent EU refusal to end its arms embargo on China, would have a negative impact on 
the partnership in general, Peter Mandelson, trade commissioner of the EU, took pains to 
leave the door open for negotiations and to avoid a confrontation with the Chinese.  
The  formal  negotiations  between the  two  sides  reached  an  agreement  in  June 
2005, introducing quotas on some of the categories of Chinese textile products. However, 
European importers took advantage of the month-long delay of the enforcement of the 
restrictions and placed huge orders in an attem pt to get quota-free  goods  into  Europe 
before the deadline arrived. The newly introduced quotas were rapidly exceeded. From 
July to September 2005, millions of Chinese garments piled up at EU ports awaiting a 
new round of negotiation between Brussels and Beijing. This issue had to be solved as it 
threatened to sour EU-China trade relations specifically and the partnership in general. 
Agreement was reached in early September  that year when the British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair held the rotating presidency of the EU.  
The textile dispute revealed some problems in bilateral economic relations. First, 
although  the  member  states  have  already  transferred  part of  their  sovereignty  to the 
European Commission, and the latter has the right to make overall decisions concerning 
the economic and trade policies of the Union, the Commission and the member states 
differ about trade relations with China. Different member states have different interests in 
trade  issues,  with  the  countries  in  the  north  promoting  market  liberalization a n d  t h e  
countries in the south trying desperately to protect their markets. It is therefore difficult 
for  the  Union  to  speak  with  one  voice.  Secondly,  within  specific  countries,  specific 
groups  have  different i n t e r e s t s .  Trading  companies,  wholesalers  and  consumers 
benefiting from cheap products from China are naturally in favor of more imports from 
China. In contrast, European workers and textile enterprise owners, unable to compete 
with cheap labor in China, want to exclude and limit Chinese imports. Thirdly, both the 
EU  and  China l a c k  a  necessary  understanding  of  each  other’s  market  development. 
Information exchange should therefore be strengthened. For example, the US has more 
than 1,000 employees  in  its embassy  in  Beijing, whereas the EU has only about 100 
people in its delegation in Beijing, with only about ten people in charge of trade relations 
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with China. Facing growing trade between the two sides, the EU needs to invest more 
human resources in this field. How trade relations will develop in the coming years will 
largely depend on the policy coordination of the two sides, with China trying to devote 
major efforts to removing market access barriers to EU exports to the Chinese market, 
and the EU facing up to the challenge of economic liberalization. As the basis of the EU-
China strategic partnership, economic relations have a direct impact on bilateral relations 
in other fields. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In examining the development of EU-China relations and the establishment of a 
strategic  partnership,  this p a p e r  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  b o t h  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
environment and domestic developments on each side have played an important role in 
bringing  the  two  closer  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  The  confrontational  Cold  War 
circumstances  and  the  conflictual  ideologies h e l d  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n s  a n d  t h e  C h i n e s e  
prevented bilateral relations from developing independently. Despite the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between Brussels and Beijing in 1975, neither side was seriously 
committed to developing their bilateral relations until the 1990s.  
The  collapse  of  bipolarity  fundamentally  changed  the  international  political 
structure. As a consequence of relaxation in the external environment, economic issues 
largely replaced the security and military issues and topped the agenda of national policy-
making. A focus on economic growth and the promotion of globalization in the post-Cold 
War era have noticeably enhanced economic interdependence between many countries. 
Between the EU and China, trade relations and economic cooperation serve as the basis 
for t h e  p a r t n e r s h i p .  W i t h o u t  t h e  d r a m a t i c  i n c r e a s e  o f  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
cooperation in the past ten years and more, bilateral relations would not have been as 
important as they are now. The comparative advantage each side possesses attracts the 
two  towards m o r e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  g r o w i n g  d e f i c i t  t h e  E U  has 
developed in its trade with China is a serious problem. If this problem is not addressed in 
a cautious way, the strategic partnership may be damaged. 
The EU and China share an understanding about the importance of maintaining 
international peace and stability. Such understanding constitutes an essential part of the 
strategic partnership. To gain an increasing influence in international affairs, each has 
learned th at a m ul til ateral  f ram ework i s better th an  unil ateral i sm . Nevertheless, when 
China promotes the multilateral approach internationally, it’s idea is to counterbalance 
American  dominance  and  to  frustrate  the  superpower  status  of  the  US g l o bally.  In 
contrast, the EU remains a close ally of the US in the post-Cold War era. Despite the 
differences between the US and some of the member states of the EU, the cooperative 
nature  of  the  transatlantic  relationship  will  not  change.  Between  China  and  the  US, 
relations  are  characterized b y  both  competition  and  cooperation,  with  strategic 
competition as a major focus. Between the EU and China, both have become noticeably 
more independent in taking initiatives to strengthen their bilateral relations. However, the 
US  remains t h e  e x t e r n a l  p o w e r  w h i c h  e x e r t s  a  v i s i b l e  i n f l u e n c e  o n  B r u s s e l s -Beijing   19 
relations. The arms embargo issue is a typical example in EU-China relations that reveals 
how much influence the US has over both of them. With regard to the rapid rise of both 
the EU and China in international politics and the dominant position of the US; the EU, 
the US, and China may form a complicated triangular relationship in the 21st century. In 
the opinion of David Shambaugh, “The interaction of the United States, China, and the 
EU will be a defining feature of the international system in the years to come.” 
55
 
Policy convergence and divergence between the EU and China will not be static. 
Following economic and political developments on each side and changes in international 
relations, the two sides will find both shared and conflicting interests on a wide range of 
issues. In particular, with “low politics” issues becoming more important in global affairs 
(for  example,  environmental p r o t e c t i o n ,  e n e r g y  s u pply,  and  sustainable  economic 
development), strengthened inter-governmental cooperation will be required, and the EU-
China strategic partnership will face new challenges.  
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